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On Serving Society with One's Conscience: 
The Responsibilities of Criminal Justice Officials*
Kimberley Brownlee
DRAFT – Please do not cite without permission 
This paper focuses upon the moral responsibilities of criminal justice officials. I take as my 
starting point Joseph Raz's claim that there is a difference between how courts should decide cases 
according to the law and how courts should decide on the cases that come before them. 
‘Sometimes’, he says, ‘courts ought to decide cases not according to the law but against it. Civil 
disobedience, for example, may be the only morally acceptable course of action for the courts.’1 
While ‘civil disobedience’ does not necessarily well describe what judges or juries do when they 
conscientiously decide cases against the law (since their conduct is not necessarily illegal and since 
it typically does not expose them to the threat of state punishment), the claim that sometimes they 
should conscientiously decide against the law points to a more general question about legal officials 
and, for our purposes, criminal justice officials: In a reasonably just criminal justice system 
(assuming such a system could exist), should an official, irrespective of her position, sometimes 
conscientiously act against the legal rules and lawful orders that shape her office?2  Should a police 
officer sometimes decline to detain or to arrest a known offender even though instructed to arrest 
her? Should a prosecutor sometimes conscientiously dismiss a charge, or routinely dismiss a certain 
type of charge, even though there are sufficient legal grounds to proceed to trial? Should a jury 
sometimes acquit an obviously guilty person? Should a prison officer sometimes conscientiously 
decline to impose a lawful sentence of incarceration?  
The claim that sometimes the only morally acceptable course of action for a criminal justice  
official is not to adhere to the dictates of her office3 seems difficult to defend when made against the 
background assumption that the institutional framework is normatively valid in the sense that 1) the 
institutions are founded upon morally legitimate principles and values that 2) function, by and large, 
as intended, and 3) those legitimating principles and values are standardly thought to trump 
whatever principles or values inform non-adhering actions. Even so, affirmative answers to the first 
two questions just posed may seem relatively uncontroversial, or certainly less controversial than 
affirmative answers to the latter two, since there are generally recognised notions of police and 
prosecutorial discretion (in common law systems), but not of jury discretion or prison officer 
discretion. One might think, therefore, that only when the demands of one’s office are 
underdetermined should one employ first-order moral reasoning about how best to act; when one’s 
office grants one little or no formal discretion, non-adherence to directives in all but the most 
extreme cases would constitute a threat to the valuable institutions of which one’s office is a part.  
Or, relatedly, one might think that officials lower down the institutional ladder are more likely to 
make mistakes, as they have limited access to relevant information and less time to make relevant  
decisions, because their offices are not constructed to allow them to make certain kinds of 
judgements.4 But, the recognised distribution of formal discretion can be questioned, as can 
assumptions about people's relative access to relevant information. Also, even for those whose 
offices do grant them some discretion, the question remains whether sometimes they should step 
beyond what that discretion allows. 
*  I would like to thank Adam Cureton, Claire Grant, Michelle Madden-Dempsey, Zofia Stemplowska, Hillel Steiner, 
and Steve de Wijze for their helpful comments on previous drafts. 
1  Raz, Joseph (1994), Ethics in the Public Domain. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 328. 
2 The label ‘official’ applies here to all members of a community who assume, however briefly, some official position 
within the institutional structures of the criminal justice process. Thus, this term applies to jurors as well as judges, 
prosecutors, police officers, defence attorneys, and prison officers. 
3  This notion will be spelled out in Section 2 as the combination of 1) not acting in accordance with the reason that 
one is directed to act (non-conformity) and 2) not acting for the reason that one is directed to act (non-compliance).  
4 I thank Zofia Stemplowska for noting this point. 
Taking a different view of discretion, one might think that persons who are higher up the 
institutional ladder or persons who are most visible within the criminal justice system have the most 
stringent duty to ‘follow orders’. Non-adherence by these officials, unlike that of less scrutinised 
officials, may seem to threaten valuable institutions by undermining people's confidence in the 
workings of those institutions. Joel Feinberg observes that the high court judge is not protected by 
the same degree of secrecy as the mere juror. Nor can she so easily escape sanctions afterward, 
being subject to impeachment and subject to social pressure to give an account of each judicial  
decision and mode of argument.5 But, these potential costs of non-adherence for the judge and 
perhaps for people's confidence must be weighed against other costs that arise through general 
adherence (including costs that should weaken people's confidence). 
The claim of this paper is that a conceptual gap exists between the dictates of normatively 
legitimate offices and the special responsibilities of their occupants. In other words, the morally 
acceptable course of action for a criminal justice official, regardless of position, often may deviate 
from the rules and orders governing her office even in a reasonably just system. When it does, she 
ought not to adhere to those rules or orders. These claims will be defended by examining in Section 
1, first, the notion of a role, and second, the nature of morally legitimate (morally justified) roles. 
Morally legitimate roles generate special moral responsibilities for their holders, which can diverge 
for various reasons from the expectations of formal offices even in a reasonably just system. The 
most notable of those reasons is that, due to the rigidifying and generalising nature of formal 
institutions even in reasonably just systems, criminal justice officials are called upon to engage in 
morally problematic practices as a matter of course. Attention then will be given in Section 2 to 
particular contexts in which a person ought not to adhere to her criminal justice office, and which 
form of non-adherence – from covert rule-departure to thwarting the process, to resigning6 – would 
be morally most acceptable. Despite the general nature of the above claims, it is difficult to argue in  
general terms about the moral obligations of persons whose situations differ as greatly as do those 
of various criminal justice officials.7 Thus, it may be possible only to draw modest general 
conclusions about the moral acceptability of certain forms of non-adherence by particular officials.  
1. Formal Demands and Special Responsibilities  
A 'role' is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary (current online edition) as 1) The typical 
or characteristic function performed by someone or something; and 2) The behaviour that an 
individual feels it appropriate to assume in adapting to any form of social interaction; the behaviour 
considered appropriate to the interaction demanded by a particular kind of work or social position. 
One point to note here is that the descriptive appropriateness of a certain kind of behaviour as part 
of a recognised role or position says nothing about the moral merit of that kind of behaviour. The 
behaviour that is descriptively appropriate to the role of assassin, for example, is not morally 
defensible as a general form of conduct. The behaviour 'appropriate' to a ditch-digger ceteris  
paribus is morally neutral or trivial. The roles of assassin and ditch-digger do not pick out moral 
5  Joel Feinberg argues that: ‘The conscientious judge’s situation is quite different [from that of the ordinary citizen or 
the juror], especially when he is a judge in the nation’s highest appellate court...the judge does not have legal power 
of the same degree of effectiveness as that of the ordinary citizen or the juror. Paradoxically, the higher we climb in 
the court system, the less effective power to breach official duties do we find. I suspect that is because the duties 
themselves, at that level, are regarded with awe and thought to be of maximum or supreme stringency.’ Feinberg, 
Joel (2003), Problems at the Roots of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 17. Michelle Madden-Dempsey has 
observed in conversation that Feinberg's view may conflate strong discretion with weak discretion. Although, contra 
Dworkin, judges may exercise strong discretion (in determining standards of reasonableness, for example), they 
nonetheless may lack weak discretion to be the final arbiter on a case; social pressures will limit a judge's weak 
discretion to say whether some conduct satisfies a given standard.  
6  One might question whether resignation is a form of non-adherence because resigning may seem to cancel the 
reasons that applied to one when one held a certain position. As I argue in Section 2, unless one resigns with due 
notice and makes adequate provision for someone else to fulfil the moral responsibilities one had, the reasons that 
apply to one are not cancelled by one's resignation.  
7 Although somewhat neglected in political philosophy and criminal justice theory, officials' responsibilities are 
interesting because typically officials both claim authority, some of which in a just regime they have, and are subject 
to claimed authority, some of which may be legitimate.
reasons that apply, in virtue of their content, to the holders of those roles. Morally legitimate roles,  
by contrast, are ones in which particular, if not unique, moral reasons apply to their holders. More 
specifically, when one assumes or comes to hold a morally legitimate role, this affects one’s moral 
responsibilities in various ways. For example, some reasons come to apply to one which did not 
apply to one before; some reasons that may have applied to one before as ordinary reasons now 
apply as categorical mandatory reasons, and vice versa.8 Borrowing Raz’s example, the moral 
reason to respect one’s child applies, in virtue of its content, only to one who is a parent.9 Other 
moral reasons apply, in virtue of their content, only to pregnant women, or to trained lifeguards, or 
to trained medical practitioners, or to the adult children of elderly parents, and so on. Whereas some 
morally legitimate roles have fairly precise features and well-defined responsibilities (e.g. parent,  
friend, etc.), other morally legitimate roles pick out general categories of moral responsibility (e.g.  
carer, healer, protector, advocate, mediator, etc.). One can come to assume such roles in various 
ways (depending upon the core features of the role in question), such as voluntarily or non-
voluntarily, formally or informally, individually or collectively, immediately or over time from 
continued behaviour and developed expectations. Articulating the features of a given morally 
legitimate role as fully as possible will be necessary for an adequate appreciation of the range of 
moral reasons that apply to one who holds that role. 
In a reasonably just criminal justice system, the principal offices that comprise that system 
are structured so as to embody as well as possible within its particular institutional framework and 
legal tradition the various morally legitimate roles that are necessary for both the reasonable 
prevention of serious wrongdoing and a justifiable response to such wrongdoing. There is a 
plurality of ways in which a society may endeavour to realise such important roles as protector, 
public spokesperson, advocate, mediator, counsellor, healer, and educator, through the creation of 
certain professional offices in a formalised web of interlocking expectations. Given the plurality of 
legitimate ways in which a system may be structured, the chosen structure of a particular system 
will shape the special moral responsibilities of its officeholders. For example, morally legitimate 
roles such as mediator and educator, which (amongst other things) underpin the formal office of 
Judge, will be fleshed out by the parameters of this office as it exists within a given system. Put 
differently, the specific actions required to honour the special responsibilities of these moral roles 
will vary according to the institutional structures of the system. 
These special moral responsibilities do not, however, reduce to a pro tanto content-
insensitive moral obligation to adhere the demands of a formal office. An official may have an 
obligation to do as her office demands in a given case, but not necessarily because her office 
demands it. The reason for this is that, even in a reasonably just system, both the generalising and 
rigidifying nature of formal institutions and the contingencies of practical operations will create a 
gap between the dictates of an office and the special responsibilities of the moral roles that underpin 
that office. 
 First, even in a reasonably just system, criminal justice officials will be called upon to do 
morally problematic things as a matter of course, such as detain people, charge people with 
offences, dismiss charges,10 make judgements on people’s guilt, sentence people to be punished, 
impose those punishments, perhaps deprive people of their resources, and perhaps, in extreme 
cases, incarcerate people. Second, even in a reasonably just system, instances will arise where the 
understanding or expertise of a given official clearly is greater than that reflected in the formal 
demands upon her. A prison official, for example, may much better understand both the actual 
severity of incarceration (particularly upon certain people, such as young persons) and the likely 
effects of incarceration upon both offenders and the community than do either the legislators who 
enact its lawful use or the officials who sentence its imposition. Third, even in a reasonably just 
system, there remains the possibility for error (such as false positives), for improper bias in 
8  Michelle Madden Dempsey discusses some of these changes in relation to prosecutors in Prosecuting Domestic  
Violence. Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
9  C.f. Raz, Joseph (2004), ‘Incorporation by Law’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 10, 1-17. 
10  Non-pursuit actions such as dismissing charges or not charging are morally problematic in cases where, for 
example, a putative offender is clearly dangerous. C.f. Madden Dempsey (forthcoming). 
officeholders,11 and for non-institutional social injustices (in people's social situation, personal 
circumstances, resources, etc.) to filter into people’s experience before the law.12 For example, a 
judge cannot control the fact that black persons may be far more likely to come before her for a 
given offence than white persons despite comparable levels of offending. 
As these three points indicate, the realities of formalised structures are such that, although 
the moral values that fully legitimate a given office-dictate are the same as those that entail the 
special moral responsibilities underlying that office, those values do not legitimate the codification 
of such office-dictates. In other words, the codified office-dictates that those values are presumed to 
entail are not entailed by those values in some contingent circumstances.13 This is not to deny that 
there are values and principles, such as procedural norms and norms of generality and predictability, 
that can at least partially legitimate the codification of some dictates. But, those norms are distinct  
from, and indeed subordinate to, the substantive, context-sensitive, and non-codifiable principles 
and values that generate the special moral responsibilities of morally important roles, because these 
norms (often grouped together under the heading 'rule of law') are compatible with a substantively 
unjust system, and thus cannot block codified office-dictates from deviating from what is morally 
acceptable.14 
Consequently, when morally problematic factors infect other officials’ decisions, this can 
modify an official’s special moral responsibilities. This is because her morally legitimate roles will  
not make it her special responsibility to do what is morally indefensible, such as proceed against a 
person who has been the victim of grave social injustice or imprison an innocent person whom 
others have lawfully convicted. If her office demands such acts under some more general directive, 
then the morally acceptable course is non-adherence. (What form that non-adherence should take 
will be discussed below.) Similarly, in more mundane cases, where an official clearly has greater 
understanding and appreciation for the character and consequences of a given order or rule than that 
reflected in the order or rule itself, this too can modify her moral responsibilities and lead her to act  
other than as directed. 
The thesis underlying the above view is the following: No morally legitimate role makes it  
the general responsibility of the holder to forbear from engaging in first-order moral reasoning. 
Indeed, more positively, morally legitimate roles make it the holder's responsibility actively to  
engage in first-order moral reasoning. Henry David Thoreau spiritedly denounces those who would 
purport to serve their society by routinely not exercising their moral judgement: 
The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They 
are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus, &c. In most cases there is 
no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level 
with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the 
purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the 
same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good 
citizens. Others – as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and officeholders – serve the 
state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to 
serve the Devil, without intending it, as God. A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in 
the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for 
the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it.15  
Thoreau’s diatribe condemns not only those who would ‘serve' chiefly with their bodies, but also 
those who would ‘serve' chiefly with their heads, such as judges or juries, and who could be said to 
11  Officials can be stymied in their good faith efforts to act justifiably by the errors and prejudices of other members of 
their professions. 
12  An important question, not addressed here, is whether the normative validity of a criminal justice system can be 
affected or undermined by substantial social injustices in other domains that filter into the criminal justice process. 
13 I thank Hillel Steiner for helping to clarify this point. 
14 See Joseph Raz (1979), 'The Rule of Law and its Virtue' in The Authority of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  
15  Thoreau, Henry David (1991), ‘Civil Disobedience’ in Civil Disobedience in Focus. Hugo Bedau (ed.), London: 
Routledge. Original italics. 
put themselves on a par with computers and calculators in failing to reason morally about the 
decisions they make and the demands they face. Along the same lines, Feinberg argues that, what 
morality requires of a person in morally difficult circumstances is not something to be mechanically 
determined by an examination of the person’s office. An individual must on rare occasions have the 
courage to rise above all that and obey the dictates of conscience.16 
My thesis, while not restricted to ‘morally difficult circumstances’, may be restricted in non-
morally-difficult circumstances to occasions where an official clearly will better act as the reasons 
that apply to her would have her act when she attends to those reasons directly and not to the rules 
and orders governing her office. The reasons that apply to a law enforcement officer, for example, 
include, amongst other things, a reason to protect society from dangerous persons, to communicate 
the appropriate community condemnation and disavowal of a given act of wrongdoing, to promote 
both the restoration of victims and reconciliation amongst all affected parties, and to enhance 
people's confidence in the non-arbitrariness, transparency, and predictability of the criminal justice 
system. Where attending to these reasons directly clearly will better enable her to conform to them, 
she should attend to them directly even though this may lead her to depart from the general rules of 
her office.17
At this point, a critic might advance the voluntarist line that a person who assumes an 
official position in a reasonably just system has a pro tanto content-insensitive moral obligation to 
adhere to the dictates of her office because she has sworn, consented, or otherwise committed 
herself to carry out the functions of that office. In reply, first, a voluntarist argument does not apply 
to officeholders either who are conscripted into service, such as jurors, or who inherit their office 
and for whom extricating themselves from that office would be particularly difficult, such as a 
monarch. Second, the voluntarist critic presumes that promise-keeping trumps other kinds of moral 
duty even when the conduct promised entails performance of deeply morally objectionable actions. 
Third, it is no defence for general adherence to point out (conscription aside) that a person need not 
assume a particular office and is, in most cases, at liberty to resign her office. Fourth, it is also no 
defence to make provision for an official to excuse herself in cases where adhering to the demands 
of her office would be especially onerous for her.18 The reason is that, when a society establishes a 
given office within a set of institutional structures and defines the core functions of that office along 
particular parameters as part of society’s response to important concerns, society asks that some 
member fulfil that office. And, when an office, despite its moral imperfections, provides a key way 
or the only way to address certain concerns or to honour certain values in that society, then there 
exists a moral reason for an appropriately qualified member to assume that office.19 Furthermore, 
the space that a society makes for a person to excuse herself when adherence to the demands of her 
office would be onerous reflects that society’s appreciation for how she should be treated as a 
person; it does not reflect a change in society’s demands upon her.20 
But, societies sometimes have (and should have) considerable difficulty finding persons 
willing to assume offices that have these features because the offices exact too high a moral price 
from any would-be occupant. In some US states, for example, a moratorium on capital punishment 
has resulted from doctors refusing to oversee executions by lethal injection.21 In jurisdictions where 
16  Feinberg (2003), 16. 
17  Raz’s normal justification condition for authority states that the person subject to the putative authority would better 
conform to reasons that apply to her anyway if she intends to be guided by the directive than if she does not. See 
Raz, Joseph (2006), ‘The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’ in Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 
90, 1003-1044. We may assume that, in a just system, Raz’s independence condition – that [an official’s] judging for 
herself how to act is not more important than conforming to reason – is satisfied. 
18 For an examination of related issues, see Tasioulas, John (2003), ‘Mercy’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
Vol. 103, no. 2, 101-132.
19 For a discussion of some related issues, see Green, Leslie (2007), ‘The Duty to Govern’ in Legal Theory, Vol. 13, 
165-185. Green observes, for example, that ‘however we understand “necessary tasks,” they are likely to carve out a 
duty to govern that is much narrower than the claims of modern states or the scope of legitimate governance.’
20 For brief comments on this point, see Estlund, David (2007), ‘On Following Orders in an Unjust War’ in The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 15, No. 2, 213-234.. 
21 Gels, Sonya, ‘California puts Execution off after Doctors Refuse to Help’ Washington Post, 22 February 2006. 
such executions are performed, doctors may have moral reasons to be present to endeavour to 
reduce the suffering of the condemned person. But, the functions of this overseeing office (to 
intervene and to facilitate death if the person wakes up) deeply conflict with doctors’ special moral  
responsibilities to promote people’s well-being. The substantial gap between the demands of this 
office and the moral responsibilities of those qualified to assume it casts doubt on the claim that 
execution could ever form part of a reasonably just society’s response to serious offending.22 A 
similar argument holds against many forms of incarceration where prison doctors oversee 
punishments that are highly detrimental to offenders’ well-being. It does not follow from these 
observations about special moral responsibilities that a society may never ask its members to 
engage in morally problematic conduct. (Borrowing a case from outside criminal justice, a society 
may ask a registrar to conduct civil law partnerships for homosexual couples, for example, even 
when such relationships clash with her religious beliefs.23) Rather, it shows that such requests from 
society of its officials, while morally problematic, must nonetheless be morally justifiable. Close 
attention must be paid both to the institutional structures set up to address important community 
concerns and to the specification of the offices that comprise those institutions, so as to minimise 
the moral burdens those offices impose upon their holders, and thereby to minimise the occasions in 
which non-adherence is morally required or permitted. 
The distinction between special moral responsibilities and formal demands has widespread 
implications. At all times, officials must reflect upon the moral merits of the demands of their  
offices. The police officer must reflect on the merits of the call to use certain interrogation 
techniques; the prison guard must reflect on the merits of the order to imprison a given person; the 
prosecutor must reflect on the merits of the charges brought forward by police, and so on. If 
following a directive will lead a person better to conform to the reasons that apply to her in virtue of 
her morally legitimate roles, then her judgement should lead her to accept the directive as  
authoritative. But, if a directive is substantially unjust, or if, in some other cases, an official clearly 
will not better conform to the moral reasons that apply to her by following orders, then her 
judgement should lead her not to act on the directive. But what particular form should her non-
adherence take? 
2. Incompetence and Coordination 
Before considering particular forms of non-adherence, I will comment briefly on two more 
general issues. The first relates to competence; the second to the coordination and preservation of 
valuable institutions. Concerning competence, one might object to the above on the ground that I  
have over-intellectualised the requirements for acquitting oneself well in one's official capacity. One 
might think that for many officials, given the nature of their office or the limits of their own 
reasoning abilities, their circumstances are such that they would better conform to the reasons that 
apply to them if they do not engage in first-order reasoning, but routinely act on and for the reason 
that they are directed to act. I acknowledge that, in a reasonably just system, the incompetent 
official or the improperly biased official would better conform to the reasons that apply to her if she 
routinely adhere to the dictates of her offices than if she gives primacy to her own judgement. 
22 An office whose principal purpose is to kill someone as a form of punishment is not an office whose core functions 
track moral reasons. Just as there is no moral reason related to assassinating that applies to the person who becomes 
a hit-man, so too there is no moral reason related to executing offenders that applies to the person who becomes an 
executioner. Note, however, first, that this does not mean that neither an execution nor an assassination could ever 
be justified. But, the justifiability of a single act must be distinguished from the justifiability of regularly performing 
that kind of act as one’s office. In many cases, the justifiability of a single act may rest upon a value or set of values 
that differs from and outweighs whatever value might justify the regular practice. Second, the above claim does not 
imply that there can be no moral reasons for a person to assume the role of executioner; the desperately poor man 
who cannot feed his family, for example, may have moral reasons to assume this office, but there is nothing in the 
office itself that gives him moral reason to assume it.
23  For a comment on the case of Lillian Ladele, a Christian registrar in whose favour an industry tribunal ruled after 
she requested to recuse herself from conducting same-sex civil partnership ceremonies, see Sanderson, Terry,  
'Paying to be Discriminated Against' in The Guardian 11 July 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/
2008/jul/11/gayrights.religion. I thank Claire Grant for this example. 
However, what she does by routinely adhering to those dictates often may fall well below what she 
morally ought to do, and so in failing to reason well about the merits of the demands upon her, she 
does not act as she ought, even though she acts better than she would if she attended to her own 
judgement directly. 
Concerning coordination, one might argue that non-adherence at least by some types of 
officials, whatever its form, poses a threat to necessary and valuable institutions and public goods. 
A similar charge is levelled in just war theory debates against those who argue that soldiers should 
refuse to fight in an unjust war and should refuse to follow unjust orders in an otherwise just war. 
Jeff McMahan's responses to the charge are worth summarising, as they apply mutatis mutandis, to 
other political contexts such as the criminal justice process. 
It is often suggested that if some soldiers or draftees refuse on moral grounds to fight in an unjust 
war, this could compromise the efficient functioning and perhaps even threaten the survival of 
valuable institutions to which these people would rightly be committed. But even if this is true, those 
who create, serve, and are served by valuable institutions must themselves bear the burdens when 
those institutions malfunction, thereby causing or threatening unjust harm to others. It would be 
unjust to impose the costs of their own mistakes or wrongdoing on others.24
Moreover, McMahan continues: 
...the consequences for just institutions of people refusing to fight in unjust wars are unlikely to be 
calamitous...Victory in an unjust war may serve the national interest but is likely on balance to have 
a corrupting effect on just institutions...those who refuse to fight in an unjust war might in the long 
term actually benefit their country’s institutions by setting a precedent that would help to deter those 
in positions of authority within the institutions from initiating further unjust wars. It is also possible 
that those who refuse to participate in an unjust war could prompt the institutions to shield 
themselves from the instability that such challenges can cause by adapting themselves to anticipate 
and accommodate instances of conscientious refusal to fight. The enhanced institutional flexibility 
would almost certainly be healthy and would presumably involve more generous provisions for 
conscientious refusal to fight.
In the less morally extreme context of the criminal justice context, analogous arguments apply to 
those who conscientiously do not adhere to unjust demands. But, the particular form their non-
adherence takes is relevant to an assessment of its moral merits. Let us examine, therefore, how 
officials may best honour their special responsibilities and preserve valuable institutions when they 
depart from the demands of their offices. 
3. The Merits of Non-Adherence   
Before proceeding, it is necessary to examine more fully the notion of non-adherence, which 
is a combination of non-conformity and non-compliance. We define ‘non-compliance’ in terms of 
not acting for a given reason, such as not acting for the reason that one is directed to act. We define 
‘non-conformity’, by contrast, in terms of not acting in accordance with a given reason, such as not 
acting as one’s office would have one act. On this reading, each could occur without the other: non-
compliance applies to an official who does as her office would have her do, but who does not do it 
for the reason that she is directed to act. And, non-conformity applies to an official who acts for the 
reason that she is directed to act, but who fails to act in accordance with that reason. The latter picks 
up John Gardner and Timothy Macklem’s observation, 
Sometimes people perform actions for reasons which do not in fact support their performing those 
actions but which support their performing other actions instead. They have those reasons, for it 
would be logically possible for them to do, for those reasons, as those reasons would have them do. 
Unfortunately, what they actually do for those reasons is something else.25
24 McMahan, Jeff (2004), 'The Ethics of Killing in War' in Ethics. 114, 693-733. 
25  Gardner, John, and Macklem, Timothy (2002), ‘Reasons’ in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and  
Thus, an official could comply with a reason to act as her office dictates, but fail to conform with 
that reason, that is, fail to do as that reason would have her do. Although discussions about official 
action probably tend to dwell upon non-conformity, both non-conformity and non-compliance are 
important notions in this context since both the action one takes and the reasons for which one takes 
it are central to the determination of the justifiability of one’s action. The conscientious decision in  
a reasonably just system not to adhere to a directive of one’s office involves both non-compliance 
and non-conformity. 
 There are various ways in which an official might not adhere to her office when it makes 
demands at odds with her special moral responsibilities. The following is not an exhaustive list. 
Many of the examples could fit under more than one description. Also, some of the forms of non-
adherence described typically would be said to be acts of non-adherence when taken by one kind of 
official, but accepted acts of discretion when taken by another, which again raises questions about 
the distribution of recognised discretion:26 
1. An official might conscientiously fulfil only part of a demand, assuming it admits partial 
fulfilment. For example, if an excessive prison sentence is imposed upon a person, a prison 
officer might detain the person for whatever period, if any, is morally defensible, but release 
her well before the end of the sentence.
2.  An official might conscientiously refrain either openly or covertly from fulfilling certain 
demands (this is often described as ‘rule departure’). For example, a prosecutor might 
routinely dismiss solicitation charges against prostitutes on the grounds that it is unjust for 
the police to target these persons whilst never arresting their ‘clients’, and that the 
prostitutes were not culpable for any actual wrongdoing.27 
3. An official might seek conscientiously to thwart the fulfilling of a demand by herself or 
anyone else. For example, a prison officer might release an innocent convicted person, 
thereby ensuring that (if the person is not recaptured) no replacement official could carry out 
the order. 
4. An official might endeavour conscientiously to contest a demand and/or to reform the 
structures and practices that give rise to it (and where that process of contestation or 
reformation fails she then must decide whether to fulfil, partially fulfil, refuse to fulfil, or 
thwart the fulfilling of the demand). For example, a prosecutor might dismiss charges under 
a law that she has reason to believe should be declared unconstitutional. Or, a judge might 
declare the law to be other than she believes it to be.28
5. If she has the power, an official might conscientiously remove herself from a particular 
decision process. For example, the anaesthesiologists in the capital punishment case of 
Michael Morales (noted above) recused themselves at the eleventh hour from their agreed 
role of overseeing the execution. Similarly, a judge might recuse herself from hearing a case 
where the minimum sentence is severe and a finding of guilt by a jury seems likely.  
6. An official might resign her office with immediate effect so as to avoid fulfilling a demand. 
For example, a prison official might resign so as not to imprison an innocent person. A judge 
might resign so as not to uphold anti-terrorism laws. 
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7. An official might resign with due notice to avoid facing similar demands in future and then, 
in the intervening period before she leaves her office, adopt one of the first five responses 
listed above (or a response not listed here) to the demand before her. 
One reason for listing resignation with due notice separately from immediate resignation is that 
these acts can have different effects. Whereas the latter often can delay and sometimes can abort a 
process, the former is less likely to have those effects  (depending on how one then conducts oneself 
prior to leaving office). 
A second reason for listing resignation with due notice separately is that, when certain 
conditions are met, it is not a form of non-adherence. In most cases, when one resigns a valuable 
office, one leaves (and, for all practical purposes, one must leave) the moral responsibilities of one's 
morally legitimate roles to be carried out by other people. When one both resigns with due notice 
and makes appropriate arrangements for another person to carry out those responsibilities, then the 
reasons that applied to one in that role no longer apply. When one does not do those two things, 
however, the reasons that apply to one are not cancelled by one's resignation, and thus one's action 
is a form of non-adherence. 
In cases where the demand upon an official is for various reasons morally objectionable, her 
resigning with due notice can be criticised for helping to ensure that that demand may be carried out 
by someone else. Resignation with immediate effect also can be criticised (unless one’s resignation 
will bring to a halt an morally objectionable practice). As Feinberg observes, a judge who resigns in 
order to retain his integrity makes a poor hero. While his action may require considerable moral 
courage, it is of little help to those who suffer under the institution that he has distanced himself 
from (unless his participation in that institution is necessary for its continued operation).29 
There is, however, a contrasting view of resignation which has some force, namely, that a 
person should neither support a practice nor benefit from a practice that violates other persons' basic 
rights; and it is only when her participation in that practice is unavoidable that she should focus on 
reforming the practice or institution from within instead of distancing herself from it. Some of these 
general worries about the nature of legal institutions are moot in the context of a just or nearly just 
framework, but even there particular cases of moral difficulty will arise and will press the question 
of whether resignation is a morally defensible response.30  
Concerning the other forms of non-adherence noted above, we cannot consider adequately 
here the moral merits of each form in relation to each of the many offices that comprise a 
reasonably just criminal justice system. It is sufficient to show that the moral defensibility of any 
particular form of non-adherence will depend upon at least two things: 1) the special moral 
responsibilities of a particular person's morally legitimate roles, and 2) the likely costs of non-
adherence for both individuals and the community. Let us consider some examples. 
In most cases, it would be more morally defensible for police officers to contest the demands 
made of them by political agents than it would be for them to resign immediately because the latter 
decision, particularly when taken on a large scale, would leave a society without a well-functioning 
security system. The moral responsibilities of the roles of protector, guard, guardian, investigator, 
and so on, determine the morally permissibility of the responses a police officer can make to unjust 
or ill-informed directives. By contrast, it would be more morally defensible for doctors to resign (or 
to refuse to assume) offices in some detention facilities than it would be for them simply to contest 
administrative decisions about those facilities and where that contestation fails to adhere to the 
demands of the office. Here again, the reason relates to the moral responsibilities of the roles of 
healer and carer as well as the likely impact of resignation. This comparative judgement is 
contingent upon the circumstances surrounding doctors' resignation being such that their resignation 
would not result in substantially more suffering for those who are incarcerated or due to be 
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executed. Where it would, this speaks against resignation and in favour of other, perhaps more 
radical, forms of non-adherence such as thwarting the process. 
Similarly, conscientious covert nullification of a judge's instructions by a jury would be 
more morally defensible than open disregard for a judge’s instructions since covert nullification 
does less damage to the reasonably just institution of fair and responsible trials than would overt 
nullification. In a similar vein, given a prison officer's moral responsibilities, it would be morally 
more defensible for her covertly to release a convicted innocent person than it would be for her to 
disregard openly a judge or jury's decision. That said, even in cases where covertly releasing a 
convicted person would be morally acceptable, releasing that person nonetheless may not be what 
the prison officer ought to do all things considered since, if the person will never be exonerated, 
releasing her will sentence her to a life on the run. 
These examples support the two conditions identified above. It is worth noting that, in some 
cases, no ranking of forms of non-adherence is possible or necessary; sometimes any conscientious 
departure from the demands of an office will be morally preferable to adherence to a certain 
directive given the character and negative consequences of such adherence. In other cases, however, 
where coordination by officials of their activities through collective adherence will best secure 
genuinely valuable goods weightier than those that could be secured otherwise, then the costs of 
significant forms of non-adherence may be too great to make them morally acceptable in that case. 
3. Concluding Remark 
This discussion outlined ways in which, even in a reasonably just system, a person's special 
moral responsibilities can diverge from the demands of the office that made those responsibilities 
her responsibilities. This discussion also examined briefly the relative moral merits of various forms 
of non-adherence by officials to the demands of their offices. The view underlying this account of 
non-adherence takes officials’ obligations to their society to be shaped by the same considerations 
that shape ordinary citizens’ obligations to their society, which include importantly the exercise of  
moral judgement in determining how best to act. Although nothing has been said directly about civil  
society in this paper, much of what has been said implies a conception of civil society and ordinary 
citizens that does not view them in contrast to 'the state' and agents of the state. There are reasons to 
criticise the general practice of depersonalising discussions about authority and governing. The 
terms ‘the law’, ‘the state’, ‘the government’, and 'authority' all downplay the extent to which the 
formal institutions of a society are organised and administered by people, who face conflicting 
demands, and whose actions call for justification as the actions of ordinary persons subject to 
morality. 
It is a debate for another day whether any meaningful distinction can be drawn between 
officials and ordinary citizens when they each act wrongly. Some have suggested that a distinction 
lies in their level of accountability for wrongdoing.  According to Thomas Nagel, someone who has 
committed public wrongs in the exercise of his office can be just as guilty as a private criminal, but 
sometimes his responsibility is partly absorbed by the moral defences of the institution through 
which he acts; but the plausibility of that excuse is inversely proportional to the power and 
independence of the actor.31 The arguments in this paper support a less forgiving line. As John 
Rawls states, ‘...each person must indeed make his own decision. Even though men normally seek 
advice and counsel, and accept the injunctions of those in authority when these seem reasonable to 
them, they are always accountable for their deeds. We cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility 
and transfer the burden of blame to others.’32 
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